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Roger A. Lohmann 




First, I would like to thank the organizers of this session for the invitation to speak 
here today. It is an honor and a privilege to address this initial symposium of the newest 
section of ARNOVA. In particular, I would like to single out Felice Perlmutter for special 
acknowledgement for her role in proposing and bringing this section into being. As many 
of you know, Felice came up with the idea to create this section a couple of years ago, 
and she has now seen it through to realization. In the process, a lot of other people have 
been involved as well, as befits an organizer of Felice’s accomplished skill. I say “good 
job” to all of you. 
The focus of this new section on theory, issues and boundaries is a centrally 
important one for ARNOVA and I am confident that the section is poised to establish the 
basis for much of the most creative work in the field of philanthropology in the next 
generation. Under the game plan that Felice, Mark, Martha, Roseanne and I agreed to, my 
brief here is to engage you from the vantage point of the VA in ARNOVA – voluntary 
action – while Mark focuses on the NO. After trying to work in all three dimensions – 
theory, issues and boundaries – I decided it would be better to focus my comments on the 
first of those three. In particular, I want to highlight the role of voluntary action as an 
alternative to what I perceive to be the dominant paradigm in ARNOVA at the moment.  
Definitions 
To begin, however, I want to note I will use the term philanthropology, much as I 
suggested previously in The Commons (1992), as an umbrella term to describe the fullest 
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range of nonprofit organization, voluntary action and philanthropy studies in mission-
oriented organizations, as well as altruistic behavior, volunteering, donation, free-riding, 
and civic participation in civil societies.  
My operational – and admittedly fuzzy – definition of philanthropology would be 
the sum total of what gets presented and talked about at ARNOVA, ISTR and kindred 
groups. My premise is that philanthropology is emerging as a distinctive contemporary 
academic discourse that arose out of at least two quite distinct streams of practice and 
academics, or paradigms. As I am using that much over-used word here, paradigm refers 
to the common sense, or taken-for-granted view held by a group of scholars or 
practitioners of some slice of reality taken as the subject or focal point of more or less 
coherent theorizing efforts. I should also note parenthetically that I assume theoretically 
informed or conceptually guided practice and scholarly research to be two sides of the 
same coin, or paradigm.  
I have no quarrel with the notion that there may be additional paradigms in play 
here today – philanthropy and civil society come to mind – but I am concentrating on the 
two original, formative ones which I believe to be of greatest practical importance for 
ARNOVA at this time. I am not concerned at all in this paper with any overall or final 
assessments – which paradigm is the ‘right’ approach and which one is ‘wrong’ or even 
which is ‘right’ and which is ‘left.’ The issues involved in such judgments are much too 
complex for any such facile conclusions now. There is an abundance of smart, well-
educated and dedicated people on all sides of the matter, and the issues involved are 
much too complex to sort into a single, neat summary judgment at present. History may 
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come down on the side of one paradigm or the other, but just now we need to be more 
ecumenical. 
What’s In a Name? The NO Paradigm 
While there is a danger of overstating our present paradigm differences, the name 
ARNOVA memorializes the fact that contemporary philanthropology arose out of two 
distinctive and separate streams of theoretical and practical interests. Let me take them in 
the order in which they appear in the name.  
The nonprofit organization paradigm, reflected in the NO in ARNOVA, first 
arose in the 1980s and has since that time signaled consistent interest in nonprofit 
organizations, nonprofit management and the structure of the third sector across a wide 
range of disciplines. The Filer Commission and the formation of Independent Sector are 
important formative events in this view. The 1987 reader, The Nonprofit Sector, edited by 
Woody Powell and published by Yale University Press, was largely the work of a group 
of authors associated with PONPO at Yale. It is still an excellent introduction to the 
parameters of this paradigm. Dennis Young, Lester Salamon, Virginia Hodgkinson, 
Kirsten Grønbjerg, Wolf Bielefeld and Joe Galaskiewicz are some of the names I would 
associate with this paradigm. 
Failure theory, social origins theory, the neo-institutionalist theory of 
organizations, and the practices of nonprofit management and social enterprise define 
several of the key parameters of this paradigm. There may be no more clear-cut indicator 
of involvement in the nonprofit organization paradigm than agreement with the statement 
“Nonprofits exist to serve the public good.” (If your response is, “yes,” you are in. If your 
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response is, like mine, “well, at least some of them do”, you may be more oriented 
toward the voluntary action paradigm.) 
The VA Paradigm 
A decade or so before the rise of the NO paradigm, a different group of 
sociologists, social workers, political scientists, voluntary action practitioners and others 
who formed AVAS knew little of these concerns. The antecedents of this perspective go 
back even earlier, particularly in the Midwest sociological tradition. The Minnesota 
sociologist Arnold Rose, for example, has a 1955 journal article and a 1965 chapter in his 
book The Power Structure, detailing a voluntary action perspective of the time. (Rose, 
1965) This was the same year that corporate CEO and third way visionary Richard 
Cornuelle coined the term “independent sector” (Cornuelle, 1965) A smattering of other 
independent scholars, including legal scholar Howard Oleck, whose nonprofit law text 
first appeared in 1956, were also operating on what we now recognize as third sector 
issues in this period. (Oleck, 1956) 
The first organized group was animated by voluntary action as a group, 
community and civic/political phenomenon. David Horton Smith, Jon Van Til, 
Thomasina Borkman, and David Mason are among those who have articulated different 
facets of the “VA” in the history of AVAS and ARNOVA. David Horton Smith’s A 
History of ARNOVA: In Celebration of ARNOVA’s 30th Anniversary tells much of the 
early history of the emergence of this paradigm. (Smith, 2001)  
Grassroots associations, civil society, social capital, commons theory, as well as 
the practices of volunteerism, community organization, fundraising, and social 
movements are all associated with this viewpoint. Growing out of my current activities, I 
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would suggest that the practice and study of deliberation and dialogue belong there as 
well. For anyone who understands the VA paradigm, it is no accident that the 
AVAS/ARNOVA publication that was renamed ARNOVA Abstracts under my 
editorship had been known as Citizen Participation and Voluntary Action Abstracts. 
Research on Nonprofit Organizations and Voluntary Action 
In the best spirit of third sector collaboration representatives of these two distinct 
perspectives, which I firmly believe do represent distinct theoretical paradigms, came 
together in 1989 in the newly formed association. ARNOVA in its creation and since 
may also systematically embrace a wide variety of additional geographic, language, 
theoretical and professional perspectives. I’ve already mentioned philanthropy and civil 
society. For present purposes, we can leave open the issue of whether any of these 
additional perspectives rise to the level of distinct paradigms. I intend to concentrate for 
now only on one of the original two paradigms for which the association was named.  
The Voluntary Action Paradigm 
David Horton Smith, in his history of ARNOVA, says that the term voluntary 
action originated in Great Britain. A quick Google search will confirm that the term is 
still in relatively widespread use there. I don’t pretend to be attempting to capture all the 
nuances this raises, or even to suggest that users of the term in Britain necessarily 
conform to the paradigm I am associating with the label in the U.S. Voluntary action is a 
topic that has many local ties and my treatment of it is necessarily local to the U.S. since 
the 1950s. 
At the present time in ARNOVA, the section of Community and Grassroots 
Associations is probably the principal organizational locus of the voluntary action 
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paradigm. In his book, Grassroots Association (2000, 24) Smith defines voluntary action 
as “action that results in significant degree from the voluntary altruism of an entity aimed 
at a target of benefits beyond the entity’s own immediate household or family.” He goes 
on to identify two principal types of voluntary action: 1) volunteer action, is 
“significantly unremunerated voluntary action by an individual or a group and results 
significantly from volunteer altruism; 2) quasi-volunteer action is significantly under-
remunerated voluntary action that results significantly from quasi-volunteer altruism.”  
Even without exploring further the meaning or the adequacy of Smith’s concept 
of voluntary and quasi-volunteer altruism, one of the immediate points of apparent 
difference between the two paradigms pops into view: The Smithian voluntary action 
perspective tends to be more interested in social action apart from, or outside of, paid 
employment, careers and professions, while many adherents of the nonprofit organization 
perspective tend to concentrate on paid employment, careers and professions in nonprofit 
organizations.  
The current refocusing of much of the field of public administration on the 
creation and advancement of public service professionals in the public and nonprofit 
sector brings this distinction into sharp focus. Comparable career development activities 
in schools of business, social work and many other disciplines and professions, combined 
with the general drift of higher education in the direction of vocationalism would seem to 
bias the matter in favor of the nonprofit organizations paradigm. Yet, a purely vocational 
take on the matter may be altogether too confining. Even professionals have some free 
time for voluntary action, and voluntary action concepts like “civic professionalism” are 
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nearly as frequent in the literature as references to donative and volunteering behavior by 
professionals.  
Structure vs. Action Space? 
Paid employment verses leisure pursuits certainly is one important marker of the 
differences between the two paradigms. An equally significant hallmark of the nonprofit 
organization paradigm is its strong commitment to a structural view that sees formal 
establishments – organizations, corporations (seemingly assumed by many structuralists 
to be the same thing) and sectors – as the central phenomenon to study. Another 
important marker of the voluntary action paradigm is, in fact, discomfort with the concept 
of sectors as a structural phenomenon. I could easily cite my own work on the commons 
and the ways in which it has been misunderstood as a structural notion. Let me instead 
introduce another voice. 
In his book, Growing Civil Society: From Third Sector to Third Space (2000), in a 
section entitled “An Alternative View: Action Rather than Sector”, Jon Van Til focuses 
on this precise question when he wrote: 
An alternative approach tends not to begin with the identification of sectors, but 
rather with a distinction between public and private action [emphasis added] (c.f., 
Dewey, 1927). This dichotomous approach introduces tension between the two 
forms of action, implicitly introducing a relationship of power or exchange into 
the discussion. (25) 
 
Later, in that same work, Van Til uses that same distinction to ground his 
characterization of ‘the third space’: 
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The concept of the ‘third space’ suggests that the third sector may not primarily 
be about organizational structures – nonprofits instead of [commercial] 
corporations or governments. Rather, the special contribution of this realm of 
human activity may rest in a particular combination of spirit and organization.  
And it may be that spirit comes first. If a human action is infused with voluntary 
spirit, it may take place within any type of organization be it nonprofit, business, 
governmental or family. (Van Til, 2000, 125) 
These statements by Van Til, together with the earlier ones from David Horton 
Smith, and the work of others including myself highlight some of the essential 
characteristics of the voluntary action approach as it has evolved. I am not prepared here 
to lay out all of the principal differences. I am content only to suggest that in terms of 
historic development, the emphasis on altruism, the place of paid employment, the 
centrality of corporate organizations and the structural conception of sectors we have the 
basis of distinguishing the two paradigms.   
 
The dualism of these two named paradigms of ARNOVA also mirrors a number 
of general dualisms important in the contemporary social sciences. One of these involves 
differences over the importance of structure. For example, Suchman (1995) in comparing 
approaches to recent research on organizational legitimacy identified two approaches that 
he termed strategic and institutional: 
Work in the strategic tradition…. adopts a managerial perspective and emphasizes 
the ways in which organizations instrumentally manipulate and deploy evocative 
symbols in order to garner societal support. In contrast, work in the institutional 
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tradition…. adopts a more detached stance and emphasizes the ways in which 
sector-wide structuration dynamics generate cultural pressures that transcend any 
single organization’s purposive control. Although both bodies of literature offer 
extensive discussions of legitimacy, divergent assumptions about agency and 
cultural embeddedness often lead them to ‘talk past one another.’ 
While Suchman (1995) employs the terms strategic and institutional, Anthony 
Giddens (1979, 1984) used a roughly similar distinction to speak more generally of  
‘agentic’ approaches to social theory, and  ‘structural’ ones in what may be the most 
celebrated effort at theoretical synthesis in recent decades. The nonprofit organization 
(NO) paradigm in philanthropology conforms more closely to the institutional/structural, 
while the voluntary action (VO) paradigm conforms more closely to the strategic/agentic. 
Recognition of important choice, decision-making and problem-solving variants as well 
as historical associations with small group sociology, points up an important individual or 
social behavioral dimension to VO.   
Why should we care about such matters? Both Suchman and Giddens employ 
their respective dualisms dialectically in order to propose syntheses aimed at 
transcending the dualisms. In terms of general theory, the single greatest challenge 
facing ARNOVA is actually two-fold: finding a theoretical synthesis of the NO and VA 
that will also serve to bridge the further dualism of theory and practice.  
Other theoretical issues and concerns may attract our attention but none is more 
central to the intellectual coherence of ARNOVA or to philanthropology as a distinct and 
unified set of concerns. Can this become a unified, coherent field of study, or will it 
remain a collection of superficially similar disciplinary and professional subtopics that 
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can be organized only into two distinct and separate paradigms? For those who come 
down on the side of singularity, a major continuing challenge facing ARNOVA, and one 
which TIBS in particular, will need to confront more or less continuously is what might 
be done to bridge the gap between its two formative paradigms?  
We are dealing with some complex and difficult questions here. Is the unit of 
analysis organizations? Corporations? Associations? Sectors? Or is it choices? Social 
processes?  Behavior? And if it is both, will it be based on any algorithms other than a 
preference for diversity and eclecticism? 
We can be guided to some degree in this effort by Giddens’ efforts to create a 
model he called structuration, even when it appears that he is most likely wrong. In the 
Blackwell Companion to Social Theory, Ira Cohen (1999) argues that Giddens’ attempted 
general resolution sought to transcend two conceptual dualisms simultaneously: One is 
the division distinguishing the conscious subject from social collectivities, referred to as 
the subject/object dualism. The other is the division between agency (praxis, in classical 
social theory, or practice in ARNOVA discussions) and collective forms of social life, 
AKA the agency/structure dualism. Giddens’ attempt at a synthesis was noble but 
unsuccessful, according to Cohen, because in the end he conflated the two: 
Despite the appearance of collectivities as the second term in each couplet, these 
dualisms are not the same. To highlight the distinction in brief: the subject/object 
dualism presumes a conscious agent as the locus of action while the 
agency/structure dualism presumes enacted forms of conduct as the locus of 
action. (130)  
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 There is a peculiar danger in all of this as well, pointed up by many different 
approaches to ‘post-modernism’ in the social sciences and humanities today and that is 
the danger that the whole theoretical enterprise will collapse into a paroxysm of 
relativism. While the view that all positions are correct will do much to smooth the group 
dynamics involved, it will do nothing to resolve any of the important theoretical issues 
that separate the paradigms. On the whole, theory will be better served by a few civilly 
conducted debates over fundamental issues than by a group hug. 
Toward a Unified Paradigm 
At the very least, the terms of this pair of dualisms allow us to differentiate the 
nonprofit organization and the voluntary action paradigms more clearly, and to pose the 
theoretical problem they constitute for philanthropology as a whole. Conscious agents or 
actors engaged in deciding, giving, volunteering, advocating, speaking, listening and 
worshiping do, indeed, appear most prominently as the central figures in voluntary action 
approaches.  And in typically structural approaches, these same individual agents do 
largely disappear into the taken-for-granted background of their ‘enacted forms of 
conduct’ while pride of place is afforded to institutionalized structures like organizations 
and sectors.  
I am reminding myself as much as anyone when I note that Giddens, Cohen and 
the many structuralist critics of the pragmatist approach to practice of Mead, Dewey, et. 
al., and other agentic perspectives must be heeded in their calls for reconciling practice to 
the persistent properties of collective life. This issue affects many voluntary action 
practice problems, from volunteering to civil society and the practice of philanthropy.  
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Many of the most important questions to keep in mind here are rather neatly 
symbolized in my view by the metaphor of the tragedy of the commons, with its focus on 
free-riding behavior. Indeed, as I argued in The Commons (1992) and elsewhere whatever 
rational imperatives may be imputed to free ride in philanthropic institutions, the actual 
practice of philanthropy is not unavoidably tragic and the reasons it is not are directly at 
issue here. Donors certainly grumble and complain or silently resent free riders, and they 
may trim their own donations as a result. But the fact remains that donative institutions 
continue to exist; freeriding may be toxic, but it is not consistently or unavoidably fatal to 
the practice of the commons. 
It is important here to simultaneously avoid the agentic fallacy that all forms of 
social action are at all moments the singular results of deliberate choice, and the 
structuralist fallacy that all choices are epiphenomenal, the ineluctable imperatives of 
institutional scripts. We need instead to find suitable places for habit, ritual, routine and 
the unconscious alongside rational choice as forms of action. While social philosophers 
like John Dewey long ago, and Pierre Bourdieu more recently offered ingenious general 
philosophical formulations of the role of the habitual in practice, it is by no means clear 
that either the voluntary action and nonprofit organization paradigms make adequate 
provision for this dimension. (Dewey, 1927; Bourdieu, 1990) Because of the importance 
of trust and networks in social capital, this issue also figures importantly there. 
 At the same time, structure without conscious agents all too frequently strives to 
make the practice of nonprofit organization or voluntary action little more than the 
enactment of ritualized ‘practice principles’ The many ramifications of this are, in my 
view, wrecking untold damage in third sector institutions and practices in our time. The 
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objectivism behind the notion that it makes sense to single out certain aspects of complex 
action sequences and label them definitively as ‘outcomes’, for example, contributes 
directly to a false sense of certainty about the degree to which the implications of 
structured behavior – including intent, consequences and causation – can be known to 
contemporary observers.   
This same structuralist urge lurks behind the willingness to group together what 
may be highly diverse forms of voluntary action under broad headings like ‘coordination’ 
and then attempt to generalize about the ‘best practice’ of them. And, it must be noted, to 
do so all too frequently on the basis of non-randomly drawn samples of insufficient size 
to statistically support any conclusions whatsoever. Such approaches tend to wash out 
entirely any prospect of uniqueness, individuality and singularity in human events, and 
discount the genuine artistry involved in philanthropic practice. 
It is truly difficult to comprehend which of these weaknesses in the practice 
implications of voluntary action and structural paradigms are the most misleading and 
dangerous in practice. If Giddens and Cohen are correct, both ought to receive our 
attentions as theoretical concerns. 
Conclusion 
Practice in the NO paradigm consists primarily of creating and maintaining 
nonprofit organizations along with generalizable rules (policies and procedures) for 
managing the routines of organizational life. This is task of considerable complexity and 
subtlety it must be noted.  
In its more robust sense the practice of voluntary action embraces many distinct 
forms of social action, from ‘rational choice’ or decision-making, to voluntary 
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association, fund raising, and religious, charitable, and other forms of prosocial behavior. 
There is a danger that by simple analogy with the nonprofit organizations paradigm 
voluntary action theorists will strive to define what Smith calls ‘altruism’ and Van Til 
calls ‘the third space’ primarily in terms of groups, communities, social movements and 
other forms of structured social organization. 
Instead, voluntary action theory needs to continue striving to ground a sense of 
the third sector completely beyond this organizational frame. A third sector as a distinct 
space outside of households and beyond markets and states is not necessarily constituted 
by organizations. The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and a relatively small 
number of other provisions in federal and state law, together with their justifications in 
normative political and social theory simultaneously locate and define the U.S. third 
sector as a protected space for voluntary action. Viewed thus, the third sector is not a 
structure, but a third space for voluntary collective action, a domain of rights protecting 
association, public speech, the exercise of religion, what media scholars following J.S. 
Mill still term ‘the marketplace of ideas’, the relations between citizens and their 
government and the ways in which people associate with one another as citizens. This 
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